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BUNDLE THEORY WITH KINDS
By Markku Keinänen1 and Tuomas E. Tahko2
Is it possible to get by with just one ontological category? We evaluate L.A. Paul’s attempt to do so:
the mereological bundle theory. The upshot is that Paul’s attempt to construct a one category ontology
may be challenged with some of her own arguments. In the positive part of the paper we outline a two
category ontology with property universals and kind universals. We will also examine Paul’s arguments
against a version of universal bundle theory that takes spatiotemporal co-location instead of compresence
or coinstantiation as the feature by which we can identify genuine bundles. We compare this novel
theory, bundle theory with kinds, and Paul’s mereological bundle theory and apply them to a case study
concerning entangled fermions and co-located bosons.
Keywords: bundle theory, categories, universals, natural kinds, kind universals,
formal ontology.
I. INTRODUCTION1
Over the last decade and a half, L.A. Paul (2002, 2006, 2012, 2013, 2017) has
developed a sophisticated version of universal bundle theory, the ‘mereological
bundle theory’. The theory aims to produce a one category ontology, which
goes toward collapsing the distinction between substance and property: sub-
stances turn out to be merely mereological complexes of properties and hence
not an ontological category in their own right. The precursors of this type
of view include the trope bundle theories of Keith Campbell (1990); Williams
(1953); Simons (1994), as well as Russellian bundle theory, which takes objects
to be bundles of universals. These views share the virtue of parsimony, since
they attempt to get by with just one fundamental ontological category. Unlike
in traditional substance-attribute accounts, in these views properties are not,
fundamentally, properties of objects, since the properties themselves are more
fundamental than the objects they constitute. Rather, properties are particular
1 Author names are presented in alphabetical order; both authors have contributed to the
paper equally.
C© The Author 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of
St Andrews. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in
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or universal natures from which objects are constructed (cf., e.g. Campbell
1990: 20). But operating with just one category comes with its costs as well: all
the traditional bundle theories must account for the problem of distinguishing
between the bundles (of properties) that constitute objects and mere collec-
tions of properties. The classic attempts to deal with this problem involve the
introduction of new primitives, such as ‘compresence’ or ‘coinstantiation’.
Another difficulty for universal bundle theories concerns the validity of the
principle of identity of indiscernibles – does the bundle theory rule out distinct
objects with exactly the same pure properties that stand in exactly the same
(pure) relations? In answering this question, bundle theorists divide roughly
into two groups. According to some of them (e.g. O’Leary-Hawthorne (1995)
and Curtis (2014)), the bundles constituted by the identical universals are them-
selves multi-located objects. Others deny this and introduce different kinds of
additional constructions like instances of bundles (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004),
bundles of instances (Zhang 2018), or non-reducible but dependent objects
(Benocci 2018) to allow for distinct objects ‘grounded in’ exactly the same uni-
versals. Finally, Paul (2017) does not introduce such additional constructions
but maintains that exactly the same universals can be parts of distinct objects
having primitive identity conditions.
In this paper, we develop a novel version of bundle theory, which starts from
bundles of property universals – like traditional Russellian bundle theory – but
also includes substantial kind universals. Nevertheless, we deny the existence
of objects even as entities constituted by or dependent on universals. There are
only mere pluralities of property universals taking some of the roles standardly
assigned to objects. The resulting view is a two category ontology, involving
two types of universals, which may be understood as subcategories of one
fundamental category of universals. We will argue that the loss of parsimony,
if any, that this entails compared to traditional one category ontologies is more
than made up for by the fact that our version of bundle theory, bundle theory
with kinds, can address many of the problems faced by the one category
versions, including Paul’s mereological bundle theory. We aim to examine
what it would take to truly eliminate objects from the fundamental furniture of
reality without introducing ‘universal-like’ multi-located objects or additional
‘object-like’ constructions.2
Since we regard Paul’s version of universal bundle theory to be the most
sophisticated, we will focus on her version. In what follows, we will first outline
our own theory and motivate the introduction of kind universals. Our solution
uses bundles (understood as mere pluralities) of properties as substitutes for
2 One might ask how this novel version of bundle theory compares with traditional two
category ontologies, whereby both substances and properties are fundamental categories. This
would deserve a discussion of its own, but we suggest that there are reasons to favour the bundle
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objects and identifies the relevant pluralities in terms of spatiotemporal co-
location instead of compresence or coinstantiation, as we will explain in the
next section. We will then address some of the objections that Paul and others
have raised against this type of solution and compare our theory against Paul’s.
We’ll also briefly show how kind universals can be put to broader use elsewhere,
to better justify their introduction. Next, in section III, we identify some initial
challenges for a bundle theory of the type we wish to develop, focusing on
spatiotemporal co-location. In section IV, we will argue that sophisticated as
it is, Paul’s theory as well suffers from some of the traditional problems that
bundle theories face. Finally, in section V we will put our theory to test by
applying it to some of the most challenging cases for bundle theory, such as
the case of entangled fermions and co-located bosons, which would appear
to be particularly problematic for a view that uses co-location as a basis for
identifying the relevant, object-replacing bundles. Our solution involves the
introduction of complex universals. We conclude that bundle theory with
kinds is a serious contender among bundle theories and in fact it is preferable
to Paul’s version: first, it avoids problematic methodological moves such as
primitive individuation and construction of distinct entities from the same
proper parts (we shall discuss both below). Second, it avoids re-introducing the
primitive distinction between particulars and universal properties.
II. AN OUTLINE OF A BUNDLE THEORY WITH KINDS
As mentioned in the introduction, bundle theory with kinds involves two
fundamental ontological categories. They are both species of universals, the
first being familiar type of property universals and the second what may be called
substantial kind universals. On this view, bundles of property universals instantiate
kind universals. For instance, an electron consists of the property universals
mass, charge, and spin and stands in the relation of instantiation to the kind
universal electron. Our understanding of the instantiation relation is somewhat
similar to Lowe’s (2006, 2009), as we consider instantiation as a primitive formal
ontological relation between ‘objects’ (here, bundles of universals) and kind
universals. As a formal ontological relation, instantiation is not an additional
entity in our theory but it holds solely because of the existence of its relata.3
One should not be misled by the fact that the term ‘instantiation’ is often
used precisely to express the relation between objects and the properties that
they instantiate. Since we introduce two fundamental categories of universals,
3 See Simons (2003) and Lowe (2006: Ch. 3) for a similar conception of formal ontological
relations. Moreover, formal ontological relations are internal relations in the sense that they
hold necessarily, given the existence of their relata, cf. Lowe (2012) and Keinänen, Keskinen and
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we consider instantiation as the formal ontological relation between the two
fundamental categories of universals that the proposed ontology includes.4
It may be worth highlighting, again, that according to our bundle theory,
there are no objects in the usual sense; objects are at best a useful fiction.
Indeed, we regard it a potential problem for bundle theories that bundles of
universals are usually thought of as individuals. We wish to eschew this idea
altogether. To avoid confusion, let us introduce a novel term. Instead of talking
about ‘objects’ or even bundles, we regard a collection of property universals to
be a caboodle – ‘a collection of things’. Caboodles are not individuals; they are
not objects. Caboodles are pluralities of property universals that instantiate
one or more kind universals and each property universal must be in some
caboodle that instantiates a kind universal. Employing instantiation does not
make the view more costly than traditional bundle theory, which instead
appeals to a new primitive (namely, ‘compresence’). The term ‘caboodle’ is
not a primitive, it is merely a placeholder term for a plurality of property
universals. Obviously, caboodles themselves are not going to do very much
work in the theory, that’s why we need kind universals and require that every
property universal is in a caboodle that instantiates a kind universal. Note
however that we will also continue to use the term ‘object’ below for ease of
exposition when discussing competing views.
There is another motivation for the introduction of kind universals, which
is an additional similarity with Lowe’s theory and our own. This motivation
is related to the work that kind universals do elsewhere, especially with regard
to laws of nature. We will return to this below.5 For reference, we include
Lowe’s own illustration of his four-category ontology (or ‘ontological square’,
reproduced from Lowe 2006: 22; Figure 1).
We are sympathetic to Lowe’s distinction between substantial and non-
substantial universals, but as is clear from Figure 2, the view being developed
here differs from Lowe’s four-category ontology quite significantly, because in-
stantiation holds between kind universals and pluralities of property universals
(caboodles) instead of objects (Lowe’s individual substances).
One immediate attraction of the view is that kind universals may be con-
sidered to do much of the work that individuals do in traditional theories.
Caboodles always instantiate a kind universal. This is of course not enough
by itself, since we would also like to be able to distinguish, say, one electron
from another. To do this, traditional bundle theorists have introduced novel
4 Like in some other universal bundle theories, in our system, properties are universals because
they fulfil the principle of identity of indiscernibles. See Ehring (2011: Sec. 1) for a defence of
the particular-universal distinction in terms of this principle. Moreover, all kind universals are
entities that have instances, but they do not instantiate anything. Thus, they also fulfil this separate
condition set for universals, e.g., by E.J. Lowe (2015: 76–9).
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Figure 1. The ‘ontological square’, reproduced from Lowe 2006: 22.
Figure 2. Bundle theory with kinds.
primitives such as compresence or coinstantiation, but we think that the ideo-
logical cost of this move can be avoided by relying, instead, on the spatiotem-
poral co-location of the property universals. The kind universal ‘picks out’ a
caboodle of property universals, but it is in terms of the spatiotemporal co-
location of those universals that we identify the object-replacing caboodles.
This move, the employment of spatiotemporal co-location, raises an obvious
problem for bundle theory: if we were to take locations as the relata of spa-
tiotemporal relations, then how are we supposed to understand the nature of
the locations? On our view, it will not do to consider them as substances. We
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entities. Moreover, universals are capable of being wholly present and exactly
located in multiple places at the same time (see Gilmore 2014: Sec. 4.1).
There are at least two potential ways to understand this account. The first
would be to develop on a suggestion by Cody Gilmore (2003), which accounts
for the location of universals as relata of the basic spatiotemporal relations and
defends concrete universals against problems raised by Douglas Ehring (2002).
Ehring argues that if universals are instantiated in spacetime and have spatial
relations non-derivatively, then this gives rise to contradictory spatial relations.
Consider two universals U and V at time t:
U and V are each instantiated twice at [time] t, once each at the North and the South
Pole, perfectly overlapping at each Pole. U at the North Pole is north of V at the South
Pole and U at the South Pole is not north of V at the North Pole. (Ehring 2002: 21.)
Hence, universals U and V are wholly present in both spatial locations (the
South Pole and the North Pole). Consequently, U is north of V. Moreover, V is
north of U, which entails that U is not north of V. A contradiction.
To avoid such contradictory relations, Gilmore assumes that the spatial
locations of universals are also relata of the spatial relations. Hence, two
universals U and V are related by a four-place spatial relation having the
spatial locations of U and V as their further relata. This solution could easily
be extended to spatiotemporal relations between universals, although we won’t
develop this approach further here. However, since we have kind universals at
our disposal, we can suggest an alternative account.
This second possible solution takes every spatiotemporal location as being
determined by a distinct kind universal. Every location is, as it were, a way
of being. We do not take locations as additional entities, but postulate instead
that caboodles of property universals may instantiate distinct locational kind uni-
versals corresponding to each of its locations. A caboodle of property universals
can instantiate distinct locational kind universals (because certain property
universals can be located in distinct places) but there may also be caboodles
that instantiate a single locational kind universal. We acknowledge that this
requires a fairly liberal notion of a ‘kind’, but we are already operating with
a somewhat revisionary notion, since we conceive of kinds as universals.6 We
did not include locational kind universals above in Figure 2, but their role is
fairly straightforward. Yet, an acute reader may consider this picture to be
circular: if co-location is used to explain what can instantiate a substantial kind
universal, then co-location itself cannot be explained by the instantiation of a
6 Locational kind universals fulfil two of the criteria set for universals discussed in the recent
literature: they fulfil the principle of identity of indiscernibles and must have (one or more)
instances in order to exist (cf. footnote 4). We do not consider there to be any need for intro-
ducing locational kind universals for possible empty locations. Similarly, spatiotemporal relations
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substantial kind universal.7 This is correct, but the order of explanation that
we propose does not go quite like this. We propose instead that the pluralities
(caboodles) of property universals instantiate substantial kind universals and
locational kind universals. Every property universal must be in some (one or
more) caboodle instantiating a substantial kind universal. Moreover, every ca-
boodle of property universals instantiating a substantial kind universal must
instantiate one or more locational kind universals. Thus, the basic idea is that
substantial kind universals ‘collect’ a group of property universals, which then
instantiate a locational kind universal in order to have a location.
Our theory introduces two sorts of generic dependencies: first, between caboo-
dles of property universals and some (but not any specific) kind universals
which they instantiate, and second, between the same caboodles and some
(but not any specific) locational kind universals. Moreover, we adopt a four-
dimensionalist conception of the temporally continuous existence of ‘objects’.8
According to our view, ‘temporally continuous objects’ are construed by means
of a caboodle instantiating a substantial kind universal and locational kind
universals that make a spatiotemporally continuous set of locations. Although
these sequences are not individuals, kind universals can be used to account
for the existence of object-like sequences: the existence of a caboodle instanti-
ating kind K in a spatiotemporally continuous set of locations amounts to the
existence of ‘a temporally continuous object of kind K’.
So, there are at least two ways to respond to the worry about the nature
of spacetime on this type of account. With each proposal, the aim is to avoid
taking spatiotemporal locations themselves as further entities.9
III. INITIAL CHALLENGES FOR A BUNDLE THEORY WITH
KINDS
We can now move on to some further challenges that a bundle theory relying
on spatiotemporal co-location will face. In developing her version of mereo-
logical bundle theory, Paul has raised some serious problems for competing
bundle theories. Mereological bundle theory is supposed to be an improvement
7 This was pointed out by an anonymous referee for this journal.
8 See Sider (2001) and Hawley (2001) for defences of exdurantist four-dimensionalism. For
reasons of space, we leave the discussion of the relation between our account and the different
four-dimensionalist theories of objects to another occasion.
9 It might be added here that the nature of spacetime is a problem for anyone who attempts
to construct a bundle theory of this type. Other moves could be considered here as well. For
instance, Paul, in developing her mereological bundle theory, goes for relational spacetime. More
precisely: objects can be understood as ‘located in spacetime (by being qualitative fusions that
are fused with spatiotemporal relations or relational properties)’ (Paul 2017: 34). But it’s not clear
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over traditional bundle theory, since it takes the primitive relation of bundling
to be just the familiar relation of composition, whereby properties or property
instances can be parts of objects. Paul thus hopes to avoid the cost of introduc-
ing a new primitive (such as compresence or coinstantiation) to address this
problem, but regards spatiotemporal co-location as an even more problematic
solution. Even though our theory does not involve a commitment to objects,
we use co-location in picking out the caboodles that play the object roles in
our theory. Therefore, we must also deal with these difficulties:
Taking sameness of location as a sufficient condition for objecthood is unacceptable: (i)
contemporary physics cannot be right if it implies that numerically distinct particles or
things can occupy the same place at the same time, (ii) numerically distinct interpen-
etrating material objects are impossible, (iii) unlocated objects are impossible, and (iv)
questions like those about the relation between the statue and the clay that constitutes it
are decided by fiat. A primitive notion of “coinstantiation” is better. (Paul 2002: 580.)
To clarify, the cases that Paul presumably has in mind with regard to (i)
are things like entangled fermions or co-located bosons (she discusses these
in more detail in Paul 2017).10 These are admittedly tricky cases, but we will
postpone a detailed treatment of these cases until section V. At this point,
it suffices to say that we need to bring in complex universals to address this
challenge. However, for now we’d like to focus on Paul’s objections (ii)–(iv). As
it happens, our reply also serves to motivate the introduction of kind universals,
for we believe that all three of these objections can easily be diffused with the
help of kind universals.
Let’s start with (ii): numerically distinct interpenetrating material objects are
impossible. This is clearly a problem if we have nothing but spatiotemporal
co-location to go by when identifying material objects (or ‘objects’). One could,
perhaps, simply bite the bullet here and insist that interpenetrating material
objects are indeed impossible. But since we have kind universals at our disposal,
this is not necessary. This is because two material objects of different kinds can
certainly exist in the same place at the same time without there being any
issue about their identification, even if they were to share all their properties.11
This brings us directly to (iv), which is a case in point: the statue and the
lump of clay that constitutes it are indeed interpenetrating and appear to
10 We note that there are further complications to consider with such examples. Whether
bosons may be ‘co-located’ in the relevant sense is open to interpretation, see e.g. Gilmore (2014:
Sec. 4.3) and Pashby (2016). Following Paul, we will continue to speak as if such co-location is
possible, leaving these complications aside.
11 An anonymous referee points out that this strategy will not help with a case of same-kind
coincidence, such as in Kit Fine’s (2000) famous case of two coinciding letters written on two
sides of the same piece of paper. We agree that the case of same-kind coincidence needs to
be treated separately, although there may be very few plausible examples of such coincidence.
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share all their properties. But ‘statue’ and ‘lump’ evidently represent different
kinds of material object and hence we can say that the statue would not, e.g.,
survive a change in its shape whereas the lump would. The same caboodle
of property universals constituting the statue and the lump instantiates two
distinct kind universals. Moreover, the kind universal introduces a criterion
of identification, which may be used to distinguish interpenetrating material
objects. Accordingly, both objections (ii) and (iv) may be addressed.
Paul’s objection (iii), regarding the impossibility of unlocated objects, is
somewhat trickier, although we do not consider it very serious: one could bite
the bullet in this case as well and deny the possibility of unlocated objects.
For one thing, material objects are always spatiotemporally located, so if there
are unlocated objects, they cannot be material. This leaves us with abstract
objects. Here we would like to remain neutral. For those who wish to deny the
existence of abstract objects, biting the bullet is the desirable option. But there
is a potential solution available to those who think that there are (unlocated)
abstract objects as well, for one could say that objects of the kind ‘abstract
object’ are unique and thus need not be distinguished in terms of their location.
In other words, there is only one of each subspecies of the kind ‘abstract object’,
such as the number ‘2’. It’s not that we need to pick out this number ‘2’ and
that number ‘2’ in terms of their respective locations, since there is only one
of them and it can be readily picked out simply with the help of the relevant
kind universal. Moreover, although the number ‘2’ may also be regarded to
belong to the more general abstract kind ‘number’, it’s perhaps reasonable to
think that each number could be a sub-kind of this more general kind, not
unlike each locational kind universal can be conceived of as a sub-kind of
the general kind ‘location’. So, the idea here is that the kind universal does a
similar job in the case of abstract objects as the locational kind universals do
in the case of material objects. In this case, there is no caboodle of concrete
property universals that needs to be located. Abstract objects, on this type of
view, would be individual kind universals. This leaves us only Paul’s objection
(i) to deal with; we will return to it in section V.
What remains to be done in this section is to provide some further motivation
for the postulation of substantial kind universals. So far, we have shown that
kind universals are very useful in addressing Paul’s objections to traditional
bundle theory, but to avoid the apparent ad hoc flavour of introducing them only
for this purpose, we should like to point out that there are entirely independent
reasons to do so. One case in favour of kind universals is familiar from Lowe
(2006, 2009, 2015). More recently, David Hommen (2019) has argued in favour
of ‘an irreducible category of kinds’ on the basis of the need to postulate
them to address the problem of unity: kind membership explains why certain
properties always occur together. Lowe argues that we need no less than
four fundamental categories to do all the usual work assigned to a system of
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two different kinds of universal – exactly as we do – besides the categories of
tropes (or modes, as he calls them) and particulars: substantial kind universals
and non-substantial universals (properties/relations). Kind universals play a
complex role in Lowe’s overall theory, but we need only point out one central
motivation for them, namely, the work that they do in grounding laws of nature.
Any complete account of ontological categories had better say something
about how categories are related to laws of nature and Lowe has already
developed a sophisticated theory about the relationship between laws and
kinds. More precisely, Lowe proposes that we should explain laws in terms
of the natures of natural kinds. The kind electron, for instance, has it as a part
of its nature that its instances have unit negative charge. This essentialist fact
can then help to explain various law-like regularities, such as the net negative
charge of those ions that have extra electrons.
Instead of considering laws as relations between property universals (like
in the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory, e.g. Armstrong 1997: 223ff.), Lowe
considers the truthmakers of laws as properties and relations that characterize
kind universals. In a bundle theory, such as the one being constructed here, it
is straightforward to introduce the laws of nature accounting for the essential
properties of given natural kind K. Consider electrons, which have determinate
mass m, electric charge -e and spin quantum number 12 as their essential
properties. What accounts for the clustering of these three property universals
as necessary properties of the kind electron? As Lowe (2015: Sec. 6) points out,
property universals and, say, the Armstrongian second-order necessitation
relations between them cannot do the job. The main problem here is that
a set of monadic property universals (like mass m, electric charge -e and spin
quantum number 12 ) are clustered to constitute essential properties of a natural
kind in some of their co-located occurrences but fail to occur together in others.
For instance, muons can have the same spin quantum number and electric
charge as electrons but they have a considerably larger mass.
To solve this problem, we propose that caboodles of property universals
instantiate substantial kind universals (such as electron or muon). By instantiating
these kind universals, they (or some of them) constitute the essential properties
of the corresponding natural kinds. Since ‘objects’ are nothing but caboodles of
co-located property universals that instantiate kind universals, the occurrence
of a caboodle instantiating one or more kinds in a certain location determines
what different kinds of objects are in that location.
We do not mean to suggest that one should adopt Lowe’s full-blown es-
sentialist framework to enable the type of bundle theory that we are here
constructing, but it may be useful to see that the account could be naturally
combined with this type of analysis of laws. We take it that this is enough to
show that postulating kind universals cannot be deemed an ad hoc move in
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848 MARKKU KEINÄNEN AND TUOMAS E. TAHKO
IV. A CRITICAL STUDY OF MEREOLOGICAL BUNDLE
THEORY
In this section, we will consider Paul’s latest development and defence of mere-
ological bundle theory (Paul 2017). We will show that one of Paul’s own critical
remarks concerning traditional bundle theory applies equally to her own mere-
ological bundle theory. We have in mind the objection that traditional bundle
theory is implicitly committed to two categories (object and property) after all.
Paul’s critique is based on the traditional bundle theorist’s understanding of
properties as parts:
To the extent that there is an ontological distinction drawn between the natures of the
concrete objects and their concrete parts, and the abstract particulars or universals that
are their qualitative constituents, traditional bundle theory starts to endorse the neo
Aristotelian’s distinction between properties and individuals. And, as I have argued, to
the extent that one holds that properties are not literally parts, one holds that properties
are not objects, which suggests, if not a categorical difference between the real natures
of these things, something very like it. (Paul 2017: 43)
Paul has D.C. Williams in mind here. She concludes that the traditional
bundle theorist seems to have implicitly endorsed a categorial distinction be-
tween properties and objects (as bundles of properties). Paul herself insists that
there is no such distinction; her ontology is truly a one category ontology.
This brings us to another obvious challenge for a one category ontology
based on bundle theory: the individuation of numerically distinct but qual-
itatively indiscernible objects (see Paul 2017: 47ff.). The classic example of a
symmetric world with two perfectly homogeneous iron spheres is a case in
point: how does the bundle theorist account for the distinctness of the spheres
if there is nothing but the (intrinsic and extrinsic) properties of the spheres to
tell them apart? To undercut this challenge, Paul proposes to deny a crucial
premise of the challenge, which she calls the supervenience of identity thesis: ‘the
property of being identical to x reductively supervenes on x’s pure (intrinsic and
extrinsic) properties’ (Paul 2017: 49). Now, to deny this thesis, Paul considers
two options: (1) accept haecceities or impure properties as constituents of bun-
dles, or (2) endorse primitive individuation. Paul goes for (2), arguing that there
is an ‘ungrounded difference’ (Paul 2017: 50) between the two iron spheres in
question – ‘identity facts simply supervene on the objects themselves’ (ibid.).
Paul compares this move to that made by some trope bundle theorists (cf.
Campbell 1990: Sec. 3.7), whereby tropes are primitively individuated. In fact,
she recommends this move also to the traditional (Russellian) bundle theorist.
Our worry here is that Paul ends up falling prey to her own challenge. The
thought is simple: if we need to assign non-reducible primitive identity condi-
tions to bundles of properties, thus denying the supervenience of identity the-
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between objects and properties. This implicit criterion would appear to be ‘if
not a categorical difference between the real natures of these things, something
very like it’ – to re-iterate Paul’s own concern (Paul 2017: 43).
Quite generally, this type of primitive distinction in terms of non-reducible
identity conditions is the very definition of a categorial distinction.12 As Lowe
puts it: ‘ontological categories are individuated by the distinctive existence
and/or identity conditions of their members’ (Lowe 2006: 6). According to
the formal ontological approach, which Lowe adopts and which we are using
here, the basic formal ontological relations between an entity and other entities
together with its identity conditions determine the category to which the
entity belongs. So, if it turns out that we have assigned distinctive identity
conditions to some type of entity (in this case, bundles of properties) which are
not reducible to the identity conditions of its parts (property universals), then
we have introduced a new type of entity with distinctive category features.
Thus, we have also introduced a category distinction between the entity itself
(the bundle) and the properties of which it consists.13
The formal ontological approach allows one to specify higher categories
to which entities with different identity conditions belong. For instance, in
Lowe’s four-category ontology, the category of objects is one of the four basic
categories, which has more specific categories of objects (e.g. persons, living
organisms) as its sub-categories. On this understanding of categories, different
identity conditions mark out a category distinction among the entities belong-
ing to the higher category (cf. Thomasson 2018: Sec. 2.3). As Thomasson notes,
this idea, namely that ‘category distinctions among objects may be drawn out
in terms of the identity and/or existence conditions associated with terms of
each category’ (ibid.), has recently been gaining popularity. Accordingly, we
believe it to be a reasonable approach.
Let us now apply this idea to Paul’s theory. On closer analysis, Paul intro-
duces a general category of ‘properties’ which has two distinct sub-categories:
12 Compare with the different strategies for reducing one ontological category to another
discussed in Nolan (2011). If there is no way to do this i.e. if there ends up being a primitive
distinction between two candidates for categories, then a natural conclusion is that there are two
distinct categories.
13 In a one category trope bundle theory, for instance, objects are considered as identity
dependent on tropes, their identity conditions are determined by the identity conditions of
(some) of their trope constituents, cf. Lowe (1998: 205ff.) and Keinänen and Hakkarainen (2014:
Sec. 3). See also Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004) for a case in favour of numerically distinct but perfectly
similar particulars. If successful, this type of strategy might help Paul to avoid our objection. This
would require that two particulars can have exactly the same constituents: ‘When a bundle is in a
place, there is also another entity there, namely an instance of the bundle. The instance is entirely
constituted by the universals of the bundle. But the instance and the bundle are two distinct
entities’ (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004: 78). While this strategy is certainly clever, we do not think
that it avoids our objection, since by introducing an instance of the bundle, the bundle theorist
is effectively once again introducing non-reducible primitive identity conditions to bundles of







niversity Library user on 15 January 2020
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first, the standard property universals, which fulfil the principle of identity of
indiscernibles, and second, objects (or, mereological sums of properties), which
do not satisfy the principle because the supervenience of identity thesis fails for
them. Thus, on a plausible conception of the universal-particular distinction
(cf. footnote 4), Paul introduces a category distinction between universals and
particulars (or ‘objects’) within the higher category of ‘properties’.
Returning to our own theory, it is important to note that bundles of prop-
erties are to be distinguished from caboodles, since caboodles are reducible,
given that they are pluralities of property universals. This is a clear advantage
of the view that we propose over Paul’s theory, since resorting to primitive
individuation regarding the two homogenous iron spheres results in the in-
troduction of an implicit category distinction. Therefore, Paul’s denial of the
supervenience of identity thesis does not hold any advantage in comparison
with how she considers the situation in the context of the traditional bundle
theory i.e. that there is an implicit commitment to two fundamental ontological
categories.
The upshot of this discussion is that Paul’s challenge for traditional bundle
theory is alive and well, and it is equally threatening to mereological bundle
theory. This makes us wonder if we might have been better off with an explicit
commitment to two categories at the outset. Our own proposal, as outlined
earlier, is to go this way, albeit with two categories of universal rather than
those of object and property, which can, perhaps, itself be considered more
parsimonious, given that we only deal with universals. Admittedly, our theory
as well may be challenged with the scenario concerning the two iron spheres,
as it is an assumption of the scenario that the world containing the iron
spheres is symmetric and hence we cannot easily resort to the location of
the individual spheres to tell them apart. A partial solution to this problem
would be to adopt locational kind universals as we proposed earlier, since
they can specify a location without reference to other locations, and so they
may be able to give us weak discernibility even in a symmetric situation. But
more needs to be said about the details here: we have said nothing about
the nature of spacetime and the specifics of the solution would depend on
this. We will return to weak discernibility below, although the relationship
between locational kind universals and the nature of spacetime is something
we leave for further research. We now turn to scientifically motivated cases of
indistinguishable, co-located objects.
V. CASE STUDY: ENTANGLED FERMIONS AND CO-LOCATED
BOSONS
In this section we return to one of Paul’s original objections against a location-
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implies that numerically distinct particles or things can occupy the same place
at the same time’ (Paul 2002: 580). In her more recent work, Paul (2017: §2.6)
develops the relevant idea in more detail, noting that we must, one way or
another, account for the existence of systems that consist of two or more
indistinguishable objects. These could be systems of entangled fermions or co-
located bosons (e.g. 2-boson states). Paul argues that thinking of such systems as
truly consisting of two or more particles is misleading, since quantum particles
are not ‘objects’ in any usual sense. However, since we must account for the
phenomenon somehow, more needs to be said. Paul proposes that we might just
have to introduce further irreducible properties to address this problem, such
as ‘2-boson-ness’ or ‘3-boson-ness’. She explains these properties as follows:
‘the irreducibly intensive properties of these quantum states are internally
unstructured in that they are not reducible to conjunctions or coinstantiations
of multiple instances of unit quantities such as being a boson or being boson A’ (Paul
2017: 57). But while this solution does of course do the trick, we find the cost of
introducing further ontologically basic properties such as ‘2-boson-ness’ (and
indeed ‘n-boson-ness’) to be rather high, even if it is an understandable move
if one wishes to preserve the identity of indiscernibles in this context. So, it is
worth asking: can we do any better?
We believe that we can, by resorting to complex quantity universals. In
developing an account of complex quantity universals, we will make use of
Keith Campbell’s (1990: Secs. 4.3–4.4) analogous theory of complex properties
as conjunctive compresences of simple properties. As a trope theorist, Campbell
takes all properties to be particulars (i.e. tropes). Moreover, he considers the
quantity tropes falling under a determinable (e.g. mass tropes) as complex
tropes, namely, conjunctive compresences formed by tropes of the smaller units
of the same quantity. The basic idea behind this is very simple. Two distinct
mutually co-located quantity tropes falling under the same determinable, such
as two mass tropes t and u form a complex trope whose quantitative value
amounts to the sum of the values of t and u. If t is a 1 kg trope and u is a 2 kg
trope that are mutually co-located, together they form a complex 3 kg trope v.
More generally, every bundle of mutually co-located (i.e. compresent) tropes
constitutes a complex trope, a conjunctive compresence, whose quantitative value
amounts to the value of the sum of the constituent tropes.
The view being developed here assumes, contra Campbell, that properties
are universals instead of tropes. In order to construct an analogous account
for property universals, let us make a further assumption: a single property
universal, in addition to having multiple locations, can be multiply located in a
single spatiotemporal position. Take, for instance, the universal for the elementary
charge, e. We assume that a caboodle of property universals can instantiate a
locational kind universal once, twice or several times. The property universal
of elementary charge is multiply located in a single spatiotemporal position
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constituted by the necessary properties of a positron), which instantiates the
corresponding locational kind universal multiple (twice or more) times. By
being multiply located in a single spatiotemporal position, this universal, call
it u, can form complexes with itself and other co-located charge universals.
Thus, if the universal u is located twice in a single spatiotemporal position, it
forms a complex universal with the value 2e.
Campbell takes tropes to be independent existents capable of existing with-
out being accompanied by other tropes. In our theory, property universals can
exist independently of other property universals, but they must be conceived
as constituents of caboodles that necessarily instantiate some kind universal.
By this we simply mean that nothing in our theory entails that two different
property universals must be constituents of a given caboodle. In other words,
even though a property universal P must be constituent of some caboodle C
that instantiates a fixed kind universal K, there is nothing about P that de-
mands that a distinct property universal P∗ is also a constituent of C. However,
this does leave open the possibility that it’s necessary, say, for colour universals
to be constituents of caboodles where we also have a shape universal.14 This
is something that could be entailed by the kind universal instantiated in the
caboodle. Nevertheless, this is not directly entailed by our theory.
Here is one upshot. Take property universals -e, electron mass m and spin
quantum number 12 , which instantiate the kind universal electron. Since ca-
boodles of property universals can instantiate a locational kind universal twice
or more times, there can be complexes of the same universal in a single spa-
tiotemporal location. Thus, we could have co-located complexes of two unit
negative charges, two mass universals, and two spin universals. A caboodle
of these universals instantiates the kind universal electron. Since the univer-
sals of the basic states of an electron are each located twice in that region of
space-time, there are, in a manner of speaking, ‘two electrons’ in that region.
The reason why it’s appropriate to say that there are only two electrons in
this region is because each kind universal ‘electron’ requires one instance of
each property universal. Since the property universals are always instantiated
in caboodles that have the relevant kind universal, they cannot be combined
willy-nilly so that we would have more than two electrons in a location with only
two counts of each property universal. Finally, it should be noted that we hold,
as Lowe (2012) does, that instantiation is an internal relation. It is necessary for a
kind universal that it is instantiated by a given caboodle of property universals
and it can also be necessary for a locational kind universal that it specifies
the location of a given caboodle or caboodles. It can still be contingent for a
caboodle to instantiate a given locational kind universal, while it is necessary
to the same (locational and substantial) kind universals to be instantiated by
the given caboodle.
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Notice that the foregoing does not commit us to Gonzalo Rodriguez-
Pereyra’s (2004) view (mentioned in footnote 13), where instances of bundles,
here the ‘two electrons’, and bundles themselves can be distinguished. On our
view, in a system with ‘two electrons’, the property universals constituting the
caboodle of universals instantiating the kind universal electron are all located
twice in a single spatiotemporal position. Therefore, we can say that there
are ‘two electrons’ here. But we are willing to accept that there is no way to
epistemically distinguish them: only resorting to primitive individuation would
seem to enable this. Nevertheless, since we can rely on kind universals, we can
easily count these electrons (‘objects’) without any commitment to instances of
caboodles as distinct from the caboodles – in our theory, the kind universals
do the work that instances of bundles do for Rodriguez-Pereyra. Further-
more, since we hold that property universals must always be constituents of
some caboodle that instantiates a kind universal, there is no possibility of any
‘free-floating’ property universals that would interfere with the count. So, there
is a way to metaphysically count how many ‘objects’ of a certain kind there are.
And what does make it the case that there are two ‘objects’? The fact that
there are two counts of all the relevant property universals.15
This distinction between epistemic and metaphysical distinguishability is
the distinction between how we can tell that two putatively distinct entities
are indeed distinct and what makes it the case that they are distinct. We find
it important to draw this distinction, given our epistemic limitations when it
comes to examples involving things like entangled quantum systems. Taking
advantage of this distinction, it is possible to make sense of both the idea that
a system of two entangled fermions or a 2-boson system contains two ‘objects’
and the perhaps scientifically more respectable idea that such systems ought
to be considered as a whole – as complexes. This is because we can count, say,
how many co-located charge universals there are in such a system (so we can
metaphysically distinguish them) even if these universals are properly speaking
constituents of just one complex (and hence epistemically indistinguishable).
Hence, not only can we avoid postulating properties such as ‘2-boson-ness’, but
we can also salvage the (folk) idea that there are multiple ‘objects’ participating
in such a system.
One minor cost of this view is that we do need to make a commitment to
complex universals. But Campbell’s theory presents a respectable analogue
15 Note that since caboodles are already pluralities, not individuals, we cannot count them.
What we can count are (1) property universals; (2) property universals instantiating kind universals
(such as different kinds of particles); (3) property universals in specific locations (electrons). Since
a caboodle of property universals instantiates a kind universal (e.g. electron) and a locational kind
universal, we can pick out an ‘object’ in some specific location. There are of course no genuine
objects according to our theory, but we can consider there to be an ‘object’ that fills this role.
Moreover, if the relevant property universals are located twice in that location, there are two
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of the idea and we might also point to David Armstrong (1978: Ch. 15; 1997:
33; see also Lewis 1986: 30) who argues at some length in favour of complex
universals.16 Others, like Hawley and Bird (2011), invoke complex universals
primarily to account for natural kinds, whereas we have primitive kind uni-
versals to take care of that. However, because we have kind universals at our
disposal, our view requires resorting to complex universals only in cases where
we have co-located objects of the same kind. As far as we know, there are very
few kinds that are capable of being co-located in this manner, perhaps only
bosons (but even this is controversial). So, presumably there are not very many
complex universals – they would seem to be necessary only in the peculiar
cases of certain elementary kinds. Accordingly, we regard the cost of complex
universals for our overall theory to be relatively small.
Finally, let us briefly return to the case of the two homogenous iron spheres.
Now that we have introduced complex universals, one might wonder why
we couldn’t apply them in the case of the iron spheres as well. The reason
is simple. Symmetry prevents us from individuating the spheres in terms of
their spatiotemporal location, but we also cannot say that the spheres are
spatiotemporally co-located. We may note again that iron spheres are not
objects of the appropriate kind to enable co-location – only bosons would
seem to be capable of such behaviour. One remaining alternative would be
to adopt the idea developed by O’Leary-Hawthorne (1995) and O’Leary-
Hawthorne and Cover (1998), whereby we could take the spheres to be a
multiply-located, numerically unique object (see Morganti 2011 for discussion).
The idea may seem natural enough, for why couldn’t we think that objects
could be multiply-located exactly like individual universals are? Well, in our
theory, this possibility is explicitly ruled out. Recall that we pick out ‘objects’ in
terms of their location, for ‘objects’ are just caboodles of property universals
that instantiate kind universals. So, in the case of the iron spheres, if there is
an instantiation of a kind universal and two distinct locational kind universals
by a caboodle of property universals, then it appears that there must be two
‘objects’, even though we can’t tell which one is which.
What can we say about this case? We are in fact inclined to bite the bullet.
If there truly is no difference between the spheres and it is assumed that
symmetry rules out distinguishing them in terms of their location, then we
simply cannot (epistemically!) distinguish them. But notice that the situation is
16 An anonymous referee presents us with a worry based on Lewis’s (1986) critical remarks
on Armstrong’s use of complex universals: how can we metaphysically distinguish co-located yet
distinct complexes instantiating the same kind universal in a single location from a single, multiply
located complex instantiating a kind universal in a single spatiotemporal position? The solution
is to distinguish the complexes strictly in terms of the relevant locational kind universal, which
are instantiated in the complexes. This is also how our version differs from Armstrong’s. In the
case of distinct complexes in a single location, we can only count the complexes, so there is no
epistemic way to distinguish them. But where multiple locations are involved, we can distinguish
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not as dramatic as it might first seem, for it only arises in a perfectly symmetric
universe; normally, we can distinguish caboodles in terms of their location. In
fact, the situation resembles the case of entangled fermions.17 In the case of
entangled fermions, we might appeal to the possibility of weak discernibility.18
The idea here is that there is at least an irreflexive physical relation that each
fermion in an entangled system stands in. Even though electrons in a singlet
state have the same mass and charge, and neither has a determinate location
or momentum, there is nevertheless an irreflexive relation that holds between
them, i.e., something like ‘. . . has opposite direction of each component of
spin to . . . ’, as Saunders (2003) suggests. In the case of the iron spheres, the
relevant irreflexive relation would concern the distance between the spheres
i.e. ‘sphere A is one mile apart from sphere B’.
There are, of course, problems with this idea. As Hawley (see e.g. Hawley
2006: 302) notes, absolute space isn’t allowed in the picture – we just have the
‘two spheres’ without a specific location, one mile apart. But weak discernibility
nevertheless allows us to say that regardless of this epistemic limitation, the
relevant instantiations of locational kind universals by a caboodle of universals
that constitute the two spheres are instantiations of distinct locational kind
universals (and hence they are metaphysically distinguishable). This is guaranteed
by the distinctness of the locational kind universals. Moreover, if we apply
our earlier suggestion, that there are distinct locational kind universals for
each spatiotemporal location, we have all the necessary tools to apply weak
discernibility to this case. Spheres A and B (more precisely, the caboodles of
universals) will instantiate different locational kind universals, so they are (at
least) weakly discernible.
How does our proposed solution fare with regard to the well-known
Russellian objection according to which weak discernibility already presup-
poses the distinctness of the spheres, as a difference in relation presupposes
two distinct terms (see e.g. Møller-Nielsen 2016: 67)? As a matter of fact, we
have a very easy solution, which effectively bypasses this worry. For us, the
weak discernibility of the spheres is not a result of a difference in relation.
Rather, the difference in relation, and hence the distinctness, is a result of two
distinct locational kind universals. Arguably, the resulting distinctness is not
in fact mere weak discernibility, but we wish to only insist on weak discerni-
bility in light of the built-in epistemic limitations of the account. We contend
that this is enough to settle the metaphysical issue even if not the epistemic
one.
17 We should again mention that we don’t take the case to be closed even with regard to
bosons; on the prospects of discerning elementary particles, see for instance Muller and Seevinck
(2009).
18 For a recent summary of the debate concerning weak discernibility, see Ladyman (2015);
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have argued that a bundle theory with substantial kind universals con-
stitutes an alternative well worth consideration. There is some independent
motivation for substantial kind universals: they can act as truthmakers for laws
of nature and unify the essential properties of basic natural kinds. Our theory
does not involve commitment to objects as a separate category, which means
that it is at least on a par with Paul’s sophisticated bundle theory in terms
of qualitative ontological economy. Indeed, we have argued that the resulting
theory is more parsimonious than competing bundle theories because we are
not committed to a primitive universal/particular distinction and because the
commitment to substantial kind universals can also be motivated through their
use in additional metaphysical explanations. As with more standard bundle
theories, the symmetric universe of two iron spheres forms a prima facie diffi-
culty for our account. However, we believe that it is a reasonable compromise
to consider ‘the distinct spheres’ as (at least) weakly, metaphysically discernible.
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